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FLYING SOLO WITHOUT A LICENSE: THE RIGHT OF      
PRO SE DEFENDANTS TO CRASH AND BURN 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT 
People v. Smith1 
(decided July 8, 2010) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 26, 1995, court observers watched in suspense as 
Colin Ferguson, the mass murderer who gunned down six commuters 
and attempted to murder nineteen others aboard the Long Island Rail-
road, proceeded pro se in a Mineola, New York courthouse.2  During 
his opening statement Ferguson stated, “There were 93 counts to that 
indictment, 93 counts only because it matches the year 1993.  If it 
had been 1925, it would have been a 25-count indictment.”3  He con-
tinued to conduct his outlandish defense by questioning the victims 
he shot on the witness stand.4  Verdict: Ferguson was sentenced to 
315 years and eight months to life in prison.5 
Ferguson was not the first or the last high-profile defendant to 
elect to represent himself at trial.  John Allen Muhammad, the Wash-
ington sniper who went on a shooting rampage killing ten people, al-
 
1 907 N.Y.S.2d 537 (App. Term 2d Dep‟t 2010). 
2 Ronald W. Schneider, Jr., A Measure of Our Justice System: A Look at Maine’s Indigent 
Criminal Defense Delivery System, 48 ME. L. REV. 335, 336 (1996). 
3 Id. (quoting David Van Biema, A Fool for a Client, TIME MAGAZINE, Feb. 6, 1995, at 
66). 
4 John T. McQuiston, Ferguson’s Insanity Defense Angers Victims and His Lawyers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/08/nyregion/ferguson-s-insanity-
defense-angers-victims-and-his-lawyers.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
5 David Knowles, Alleged ‘Underwear Bomber’ and the Art of the Pro Se Defense, AOL 
NEWS (Sep. 13, 2010, 8:18 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/09/13/underwear-bomb-
suspect-abdulmutallab-and-the-art-of-the-pro-se/. 
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so represented himself at trial.6  His defense consisted of a “rambling 
opening statement,” and the badgering of witnesses.7  Verdict: Mu-
hammad was convicted and sentenced to death.8  Dr. Jack Kevorkian, 
the medical pathologist who assisted in the suicide of terminally ill 
patients, similarly made the decision to go pro se, which he later ad-
mitted, “was an act of arrogance he regretted.”9  Verdict: Dr. Kevor-
kian was sentenced to twenty-five years in a maximum-security pris-
on.10  Ted Bundy, the serial killer who confessed to the murder of 
thirty people, also took his hand at defending pro se.11  Verdict: Bun-
dy was sentenced to death in the electric chair.12  More recently, Za-
carias Moussaoui, a conspirator in the 9/11 bombings of the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon, defended himself at trial.13  Verdict: 
Moussaoui was sentenced to life in prison without parole.14  While 
the crimes committed by these defendants vary in their brutality, they 
do share one commonality—each defendant has embarked on a reck-
less path of self-destruction, confirming that “one who is his own 
lawyer has a fool for a client.”15 
This case note explores the ramifications of self-
representation, supporting a substantial need for greater restriction on 
the right and standardization of procedure to provide guidance for 
courts and eradicate inconsistent treatment of pro se defendants.  Af-
ter examining how recent decisions have upheld the right to defend 
pro se, this case note discusses the constitutional basis and origins of 
the right of self-representation.  It analyzes the various unresolved is-
 
6 Id. 
7 John Allen Muhammad’s Opening Statement, CNN.COM (Oct. 20, 2003, 10:21 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/10/20/muhammad.statement/. 
8 Knowles, supra note 5. 
9 Doctor Who Helped End Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 3, 2011, at A1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/us/04kevorkian.html?pagewanted=3&_r=1. 
10 Kevorkian Gets 10 to 25 Years in Prison, CNN.COM (Apr. 13, 1999), 
http://articles.cnn.com/1999-04-13/us/9904_13_kevorkian.03_1_suicide-charge-tom-youk-
jack-kevorkian?_s=PM:US. 
11 Knowles, supra note 5. 
12 Id. 
13 Dahlia Lithwick, Moussaoui Hijacks the Legal System, SLATE.COM (May 1, 2002, 6:41 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2002/05/moussaoui_ 
hijacks_the_legal_system.html. 
14 Moussaoui Formally Sentenced, Still Defiant, MSNBC.COM, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12615601/ns/us_news-security/t/moussaoui-formally-
sentenced-still-defiant/#.T0QOMJgydG4 (last updated May 4, 2006, 12:45 PM). 
15 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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2012] FLYING SOLO WITHOUT A LICENSE 1021 
sues that have arisen from the right of self-representation, leading to 
procedural obstacles for courts and adverse consequences for the ac-
cused. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In People v. Smith, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Term, held that defendant‟s constitutional right to self-representation 
was violated when the trial court excluded him from two sidebar con-
ferences after he expressly reserved the right to attend by choosing to 
proceed pro se.16  The court reasoned that this exclusion violated de-
fendant‟s state constitutional right to self-representation under article 
I, § 6 of the New York State Constitution.17 
Defendant was convicted of endangering the welfare of a 
child under New York Penal Law § 260.10,18 and he appealed his 
conviction.19  Before trial, defendant‟s application to proceed pro se 
was granted, permitting him to represent himself at trial with the as-
sistance of standby counsel to raise objections during the people‟s 
cross-examination.20  Nonetheless, at trial, defendant was “categori-
cally precluded” from two sidebar conferences over his objection, on 
the ground that his attendance at the conferences would be “too dis-
ruptive,” and would fail to impress upon the jury that he was in cus-
tody.21  However, on appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Term, 
held that the trial court‟s exclusion of defendant from sidebar confe-
rences violated his right to self-representation, derived from both ar-
ticle 1, § 6 of the New York State Constitution and the Sixth 
 
16 Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 538-39 (“The minutes of the trial indicate that defendant ex-
pressly reserved the right to attend sidebar conferences and that the court unequivocally as-
sured defendant that he would attend sidebar conferences.”). 
17 Id. at 539; N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6 (“In any trial in any court whatever the party accused 
shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses 
against him or her.”). 
18 Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 538; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 2011) (“A person is 
guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when: 1. He or she knowingly acts in a manner 
likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen 
years old or directs or authorizes such child to engage in an occupation involving a substan-
tial risk of danger to his or her life or health . . . .”). 
19 Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 538. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 539. 
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Amendment of the United States Constitution.22 
In recognizing this fundamental right, the court referred to 
People v. Rosen.23  There, the New York Court of Appeals granted 
defendant a new trial because the trial court violated defendant‟s con-
stitutional right of self-representation by similarly excluding him 
from sidebar conferences.24  Relying on the court‟s analysis in Rosen, 
the court in Smith acknowledged that “ „[a] defendant who has 
elected to appear pro se is both an accused and an attorney.‟ ”25  
Moreover, the court in Smith construed the precedent set in Rosen as 
supporting a right to self-representation under both article I, § 6 of 
the New York State Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.26  Based on this authority, the court in 
Smith established that a defendant who elects to proceed pro se “must 
be afforded the right to control the organization and content of his de-
fense, make motions, argue points of law, participate in voir dire, 
question witnesses and address the court and jury during the trial.”27 
The court in Smith also relied on People v. McIntyre,28 in 
which the New York Court of Appeals stated that a criminal defen-
dant‟s “right to self-representation embodies one of the most che-
rished ideals of our culture; the right of an individual to determine his 
own destiny.”29  The court in Smith reasoned that the trial court‟s ex-
clusion of defendant from sidebar conferences and standby counsel‟s 
attendance at said conferences blatantly conflicted with this cherished 
ideal.30 
The court in Smith rejected the state‟s assertion that the denial 
 
22 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6). 
23 613 N.E.2d 946 (N.Y. 1993). 
24 Id. at 950. 
25 Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 538 (quoting Rosen, 613 N.E.2d at 948). 
26 Id. at 539; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.10 (6) (McKinney 2011) (stating, “If a 
defendant charged with a traffic infraction or infractions only desires to proceed without the 
aid of counsel, the court must permit him to do so.  In all other cases, the court must permit 
the defendant to proceed without the aid of counsel if it is satisfied that he made such deci-
sion with knowledge of the significance thereof, but if it is not so satisfied it may not pro-
ceed until defendant is provided with counsel, either of his own choosing or by assign-
ment.”); see also People v. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d 322, 326 (N.Y. 1974) (stating that “the 
New York State Constitution and criminal procedure statute clearly recognize” the right to 
self-representation). 
27 Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 539 (citing Rosen, 613 N.E.2d at 949). 
28 324 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1974). 
29 Id. at 325. 
30 Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 539. 
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of defendant‟s presence at sidebar conferences promoted a safe and 
orderly courtroom.31  Noting alternative measures that the trial court 
could have taken, the court referred to People v. Briggs,32 in which 
the Appellate Division suggested assigning court officers to accom-
pany defendants at side bar conferences as an acceptable method of 
balancing defendant‟s right to self-representation with its duty to 
maintain an orderly and secure courtroom.33  In addition, the court 
found no indication that defendant engaged in disorderly conduct to 
warrant forfeiture of his right to self-representation.34 
III.  ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION 
A.  United States Constitution 
In Faretta v. California,35 the United States Supreme Court 
considered whether a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitu-
tional right to proceed without counsel “when he voluntarily and in-
telligently elects to do so.”36  The Court held that a defendant has a 
constitutional right to voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to 
the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se at trial.37  The Court rea-
soned that embedded within the Sixth Amendment is the explicit 
right of a criminal defendant to the assistance of counsel and the im-
plicit right of self-representation that emerges when a defendant 
chooses to waive the right to counsel.38 
Defendant, Anthony Faretta, was charged with grand theft and 
before trial requested to defend himself, rejecting his appointed pub-
 
31 Id.  Further, the court rejected the trial court‟s argument that it would not permit defen-
dant to approach the bench escorted by court officers because the jury would not be given 
the impression that defendant was in custody.  Id. 
32 728 N.Y.S.2d 763 (App. Div. 2001). 
33 Id. at 765; see People v. Vargas, 668 N.E.2d 879, 885 (N.Y. 1996); People v. Riley, 738 
N.Y.S.2d 793, 794 (App. Div. 2002); People v. Walsh, 698 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (App. Div. 
1999). 
34 Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 539 (acknowledging that a self-represented defendant “may for-
feit the right to self-representation by engaging in disruptive or obstreperous conduct which 
is calculated to undermine, upset or unreasonably delay the progress of the trial” (citing 
McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327-28)). 
35 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
36 Id. at 807. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 819-20. 
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lic defender.39  In a preliminary ruling, the judge accepted defen-
dant‟s waiver of counsel.40  However, after a sua sponte hearing in 
which the court scrutinized defendant‟s ability to defend himself, the 
judge reversed his prior decision and re-appointed a public defend-
er.41  At trial, only appointed counsel conducted the defense.42  De-
fendant‟s request to act as co-counsel and efforts to make motions on 
his own behalf were rejected.43  Defendant was found guilty and on 
appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed that defendant pos-
sessed neither a federal nor state constitutional right to self-
representation.44 
However, the United States Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction finding that defendant had a constitutional right to self-
representation.45  The Court concluded, “The Sixth Amendment does 
not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it 
grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.”46  
Moreover, the Court stated, “The right to defend is given directly to 
the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense 
fails.”47 
 
39 Id. at 807-08. 
40 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807-13. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 810-11. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 811-12. 
45 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 814. 
46 Id. at 819. 
47 Id. at 819-20.  Furthermore, the Court in Faretta recognized that the United States 
Courts of Appeals “have repeatedly held that the right of self-representation is protected by 
the Bill of Rights.”  Id. at 816.  Emphasizing that the Sixth Amendment grants the accused 
the right to the assistance of counsel, multiple courts have interpreted this amendment to im-
plicitly confer self-representation.  Id. at 816-17.  In United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 
(2d Cir. 1964), the Second Circuit indicated that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance 
of counsel was not intended to impair a defendant‟s absolute right to conduct his own de-
fense, but was instead designed to supplement the other rights of a defendant.  Id. at 274.  
The court in Plattner found support for its conclusion in the Judiciary Act of 1789, in sta-
tutes and rules governing criminal procedure, and in many state constitutions, which explicit-
ly guarantee self-representation.  Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006) (“In all courts of the Unit-
ed States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by 
the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”); 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a) (“A defendant who is unable to obtain counsel is entitled to have 
counsel appointed to represent the defendant at every stage of the proceeding from initial 
appearance through appeal, unless the defendant waives this right.”).  Thus, the implicit as-
sertion in the Sixth Amendment‟s guarantee of a right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment‟s 
guarantee of due process of law together confer a right on the accused to self-representation 
6
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The Court articulated a history of recognition of the right of 
self-representation and found a “universal conviction . . . that forcing 
a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to 
defend himself if he truly wants to do so.”48  In Adams v. United 
States ex rel. McCann,49 the Supreme Court first acknowledged an 
affirmative right of self-representation, noting that with the approval 
of the court the accused may freely and intelligently waive his Sixth 
Amendment right to assistance of counsel.50  In addition, the Court in 
Faretta relied on Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,51 in 
which the Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment provides a defendant with the right to take part in all 
events where fundamental fairness might be threatened without his 
presence.52  The Court in Synder indicated that a pro se defendant 
should even be permitted to provide advice or supersede his counsel 
and conduct the trial himself.53 
The Court in Faretta also found evidence for the right of self-
representation implicit in the language of the Sixth Amendment and 
acknowledged that self-representation has been engrained in the fed-
eral system since the establishment of the United States.54  The Court 
concluded that “[t]he right to self-representation—to make one‟s own 
defense personally—is thus necessarily implied by the structure of 
the [Sixth] Amendment.”55  Thus, the Sixth Amendment provides a 
guarantee of assistance of counsel for a defendant who voluntarily 
 
in a criminal case.  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 816-17. 
48 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817. 
49 317 U.S. 269 (1942). 
50 Id. at 275.  After defendant was convicted of federal mail fraud, he requested to conduct 
his own defense and waived his right to counsel.  Id. at 282.  Thereafter, defendant waived 
his right to trial by jury and was found guilty.  Id.  The decision was later reversed by the 
Second Circuit, which indicated that defendant could not waive his right to counsel before 
obtaining counsel.  Id. at 270-71.  However, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that be-
cause the Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant, the right to counsel was 
validly waived by defendant.  Adams, 317 U.S. at 279. 
51 291 U.S. 97 (1934), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
52 Id. at 105-06. 
53 Id. at 106; see also Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 280 (1948), abrogated by 
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 482 (1991) (reaffirming defendant‟s privilege to conduct 
his own defense at trial). 
54 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 816-17; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the ac-
cusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; . . . and to have Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense.”). 
55 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819. 
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accepts this assistance, and grants the accused the right to conduct the 
defense that ultimately determines his destiny.56  However, imposing 
counsel upon the accused “violates the logic of the Amendment” 
transforming the intended role of an “assistant” into a “master,” a 
conversion that starkly juxtaposes the fundamental values of the 
American justice system.57 
Additionally, the Court found that the right of self-
representation is further supported by English legal history.58  Self-
representation was a common practice in both England and colonial 
America, where numerous colonial charters, statutes, and state consti-
tutions protected the right.59  There is no evidence that the colonists 
or framers of the Constitution ever envisioned a system without self-
representation or considered the right to defend pro se inferior to the 
right to counsel.60  Thus, the Court concluded that the framers inten-
tionally worded the Sixth Amendment to imply the right to self-
representation.61 
Ultimately, the Court overturned defendant‟s conviction and 
permitted defendant to present his own defense.62  Although the right 
was upheld, the Court clarified that the right to self-representation is 
not absolute, indicating that trial courts may terminate the right in the 
event a defendant engages in misconduct.63  Likewise, the decision 
authorized courts to terminate self-representation or appoint standby 
counsel for the accused when necessary.64 
While the majority of the Court in Faretta strongly affirmed 
the constitutionality of self-representation, three dissenting justices 
briskly contested, finding no independent constitutional basis for the 
 
56 Id. at 819-20. 
57 Id. at 820. 
58 Id. at 821-32. 
59 Id. (“In the American Colonies the insistence upon a right of self-representation was, if 
anything, more fervent than in England.”). 
60 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 836. 
63 Id. at 834 n.46. 
64 Id.  Furthermore, in Martinez v. Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate Dis-
trict, 528 U.S. 152 (2000), the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has no federal 
constitutional right to self-representation on appeal.  Id. at 163-64 (“[N]either the holding 
nor the reasoning in Faretta requires California to recognize a constitutional right to self-
representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction.”). 
8
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right to self-representation in a criminal trial.65  As emphasized in 
Chief Justice Berger‟s dissenting opinion, the unequivocal provision 
for self-representation in the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 and sub-
sequent unequivocal omission of self-representation from the Sixth 
Amendment suggest the possibility that the founders of the Amend-
ment intended no mandate of self-representation and desired to leave 
the issue to be resolved through legislative process.66  The dissent al-
so questioned the Court‟s historical findings, insisting that the fra-
mers purposefully excluded self-representation from the language of 
the Sixth Amendment.67  Additionally, the dissenters expressed poli-
cy concerns that the right to proceed pro se would result in a proce-
dural massacre.68  The dissenters further warned that self-
representation would compromise the integrity and public confidence 
in the justice system and declared that “[t]he system of criminal jus-
tice should not be available as an instrument of self-destruction.”69 
The majority‟s interpretation in Faretta seems flawed when 
viewed in light of the intended role of the attorney, who in no way 
asserts his power over the client, but instead has an ethical obligation 
to provide his help and assistance to ensure his client makes informed 
decisions.  Those decisions ultimately rest in the hands of the client.  
Accordingly, it seems nonsensical to conclude that a defendant, who 
 
65 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836-38 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority‟s assertion 
that the right to self-representation “is tucked between the lines of the Sixth Amendment,” 
and declaring that “the right to counsel is an integral part of the bundle making up the larger 
„right to a defense as we know it‟ ”). 
66 Id. at 844-45 (Berger, C.J., dissenting). 
67 Id. at 850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is at least equally plausible to conclude that 
the Amendment‟s silence as to the right of self-representation indicates that the Framers 
simply did not have the subject in mind when they drafted the language.”). 
68 Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (posing an extensive list of procedural questions 
left unanswered by the Court‟s opinion, which he warned would “haunt the trial of every de-
fendant who elects to exercise his right to self-representation”); id. at 838-39 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (stating: “ „Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no 
skill in the science of law.  If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining 
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.  He is unfamiliar with the rules of evi-
dence.  Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and 
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inad-
missible.  He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even 
though he have a perfect one.  He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him.  Without it, though he not be guilty, he faces the danger of convic-
tion because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intel-
ligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.‟ ” 
(quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932))). 
69 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 840. 
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is required to have competent representation, assumes any subordi-
nate role equivalent to that of a servant.  To the contrary, a defendant 
maintains the ability to control his case and to find new representa-
tion if he so desires.  Thus, this analogy is unfounded when viewed in 
light of the traditional role of a servant, who unlike a defendant, lacks 
authority to terminate his master and retain a new master to better suit 
his needs. 
B.  New York Constitution 
Unlike the implied right to self-representation in the United 
States Constitution, the New York Constitution and New York Crim-
inal Procedure Law expressly set forth the right to self-
representation.70  In McIntyre, the New York Court of Appeals em-
phasized that the right to defend pro se is explicitly supported by the 
New York Constitution and New York Criminal Procedure Law.71  
The court concluded that even where the accused insists on conduct-
ing his own defense to his detriment, “respect for individual autono-
my requires that he be allowed to go to jail under his own banner if 
he so desires and if he makes the choice „with eyes open.‟ ”72  After 
acknowledging multiple motivations for which a defendant might 
want to conduct his own defense, the court stressed that the right to 
defend pro se is not absolute, but subject to restrictions to promote 
 
70 McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 326.  The court in McIntyre traced the origins of self-
representation, declaring that the right is implicit in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses, codified in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, and contained in the United States Code.  Id.; see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI; 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006).  
71 McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 326; see also N.Y CONST. art I, § 6 (“In any trial in any court 
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with       
counsel as in civil actions . . . .”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.10(6) (McKinney 2011) (If a                 
defendant . . . only desires to proceed without the aid of counsel, the court must permit him 
to do so.”).  In McIntyre, after defendant was convicted of murder and robbery in the first 
degree, he elected to defend himself pro se; however, his request was denied based on de-
fendant‟s outburst and his assertion that assigned counsel was very competent.  McIntyre, 
324 N.E.2d at 324-25.  Although the “Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the trial 
court was justified in denying the Pro se motion in light of the defendant‟s inability to main-
tain self-control,” the Supreme Court reversed, indicating that disruptive behavior which is a 
direct reaction to denial of defendant‟s motion to defend pro se, or which results from trial 
court‟s conducting inquiry in an abusive manner “calculated to belittle a legitimate applica-
tion,” “will not justify the forfeiture of the right of self-representation.”  Id. at 325, 328. 
72 McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 325 (quoting United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 
F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965)). 
10
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the orderly administration of justice and prevent ensuing attacks on 
verdicts due to lack of fundamental fairness.73 
In McIntyre, the court specified three requirements for a de-
fendant to defend pro se.  First, the request to defend pro se must be 
“unequivocal and timely asserted” in order to prevent obstruction in 
the courtroom.74  Second, the defendant must make a “knowing and 
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.”75  Finally, the defendant 
must “not engage[] in conduct which would prevent the fair and or-
derly exposition of the issues.”76  Hence, the right to self-
representation is forfeited “[w]hen a defendant‟s conduct is calcu-
lated to undermine, upset or unreasonably delay the progress of the 
trial.”77 
Further, in People v. Rosen,78 the New York Court of Appeals 
stated, “Unlike the Federal right to self-representation, which is only 
implicit in the Sixth Amendment, the State constitutional right to 
self-representation is explicit and unambiguous.”79  In Rosen, defen-
dant requested to proceed pro se after he was indicted on charges of 
conspiracy, grand larceny, and other felonies.80  The court allowed 
defendant to proceed pro se with standby counsel as his legal advisor, 
but imposed a restriction barring defendant from attending sidebar 
conferences.81  Defendant was convicted, but his conviction was later 
reversed by the New York Court of Appeals, which held that the trial 
court‟s arbitrary exclusion of defendant from sidebar conferences vi-
olated his constitutional right to self-representation.82  The court rea-
 
73 Id. at 326-27 (articulating multiple reasons why defendants wish to represent them-
selves, which include viewing counsel as an extension of the “oppressive judicial system,” 
desiring to save legal costs when defendant is of moderate resources and ineligible for as-
signed counsel, refusing counsel in order to lay the foundation for mistrial or a later attack of 
the conviction, and dissatisfaction with counsel‟s defense strategies). 
74 Id. at 327. 
75 Id.  The court noted that “mere ignorance of the law cannot vitiate an effective waiver 
of counsel as long as the defendant was cognizant of the dangers of waiving counsel at the 
time it was made.”  Id.  Moreover, in determining competency of a defendant, the court may 
assess factors such as age, education, occupation, and prior exposure to legal procedures.  
McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 328. 
78 613 N.E.2d 946. 
79 Id. at 948. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 947. 
82 Id. 
11
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soned that the quintessential values upheld by the right to defend pro 
se—“to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused”—“are 
threated when a defendant who has assumed the risks inherent in self-
representation is arbitrarily denied, despite specific request, the op-
portunity to attend sidebar discussions.”83  However, the court in Ro-
sen advised that “the right to attend sidebars is no broader than the 
right to self-representation itself, which may within an appropriate 
exercise of discretion be denied or divested.”84 
IV.  DEFINING THE UNIVERSE OF SELF-REPRESENTATION 
In the aftermath of Faretta, both federal and state courts have 
attempted to combat the stark implications of self-representation by 
instituting limitations on waiving the right to counsel and defending 
pro se.  Left behind in the largely undefined universe created by Fa-
retta, courts have independently defined boundaries in various areas 
relating to self representation, including: waiving the right to counsel, 
the role of standby counsel, hybrid representation, forfeiting the right 
to self-representation, and mental competency.  These standards are 
intended to protect the interests of pro se defendants and preserve the 
integrity of the justice system. 
A.  Waiving the Right to Counsel 
No federal requirement obligates trial courts to inform a crim-
inal defendant of the right to self-representation when defendant has 
not asserted this right.85  Hence, only when a defendant elects to 
 
83 Rosen, 613 N.E.2d at 949-50 (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 
(1984)). 
84 Id. at 950 (citing McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327). 
85 See United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 293, 295 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the district 
court need not inform a defendant of his right to proceed pro se prior to the assertion of such 
a right); Maldonado, 348 F.2d at 16 (acknowledging the burdens of a notice requirement 
which if required would make “the task of administering the overriding constitutional policy 
in favor of granting a lawyer to every person accused of a serious crime . . . unduly treacher-
ous”); see also United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 759 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 928 
F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that no requirement exists for trial courts to advise crimi-
nal defendants of the right to defend pro se); People v. Slaughter, 404 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that failure to expressly inform defendant of the right to proceed 
pro se did not constitute error under Faretta); State v. Garcia, 600 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Wash. 
1979) (concluding that no duty exists for a trial court to inform a defendant of his right to 
self-representation). 
12
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waive counsel and proceed pro se must a trial court inform defendant 
of his right to self-representation.86  However, the United States Su-
preme Court maintains that there is a strong presumption against 
waiver of the right to counsel, observing that whether an intelligent 
waiver of right to counsel is made should be judged on a case by case 
basis after careful consideration of the particular facts and circums-
tances.87  In Carnley v. Cochran,88 the United States Supreme Court 
articulated the guidelines for a valid waiver.  The Court stated, “Pre-
suming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.  The record 
must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, 
that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understan-
dingly rejected the offer.  Anything less is not waiver.”
 89 
Aside from the strong presumption against waiver of the right 
to counsel, the Court in Faretta stated that “[defendant] should be 
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, 
so that the record will establish that „he knows what he is doing and 
his choice is made with eyes open.‟ ”90  However, the Court‟s asser-
tion ignited a circuit split concerning whether trial courts are required 
to, or merely should, admonish defendants of the dangers and disad-
 
86 See Munkus v. Furlong, 170 F.3d 980, 982 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a criminal de-
fendant does not have a constitutional right to be informed of the right to defend pro se); see 
also Stano v. Dugger 921 F.2d 1125, 1144 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Once the right of self-
representation has been asserted clearly and unequivocally . . . then and only then is that 
court . . . required to conduct the requisite inquiry to determine whether the criminal defen-
dant‟s decision to represent himself is knowing, intelligent and voluntary.”). 
87 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
88 369 U.S. 506 (1962). 
89 Id. at 516.  The Court further explained: 
It has been pointed out that „courts indulge every reasonable presump-
tion against waiver‟ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we „do 
not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.‟   
           . . . . 
           The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by coun-
sel invokes, of itself, the protection of trial court, in which the accused—
whose life or liberty is at stake—is without counsel.  This protecting du-
ty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of 
determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the 
accused.  While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether 
there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, 
and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear 
upon the record. 
Id. at 514-15 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65). 
90 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 279). 
13
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vantages of self-representation.91  Although trial courts should con-
duct an inquiry into defendant‟s background by focusing on factors 
such as age, level of education, mental capacity, prior experience 
with legal proceedings, and understanding of proceedings, wide dis-
cretion rests with trial courts in deciding what constitutes a valid 
warning of the dangers of self-representation.92 
Defendant must assert his right to self-representation in a 
timely manner or else he waives this right.93  In United States v. Dun-
lap,94 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that once a tri-
al begins, the decision to allow defendant to proceed pro se is left to 
the discretion of the trial court.95  A request to proceed pro se is 
termed timely if it is made before meaningful trial proceedings have 
 
91 Compare United States v. Edwards, 716 F.2d 822, 824 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that the 
trial judge must conduct a hearing to ensure that the accused understands the dangers of self-
representation), Piankhy v. Cuyler, 703 F.2d 728, 730-32 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that it is the 
trial court‟s responsibility to ensure that a defendant is made aware of the dangers of self-
representation), United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that the 
court has a responsibility to ensure the choice of self-representation is made knowingly and 
intelligently), and United States v. Chaney, 662 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir. 1981) (interpret-
ing Faretta to require trial courts to conduct a special hearing to ensure that the accused un-
derstands the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se), with United States v. Hafen, 
726 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding that a court is not required to provide a short state-
ment of its reasons for finding a defendant‟s waiver of counsel to be knowing and intelli-
gent), Kimmel, 672 F.2d at 721-22 (indicating that while there is a preference for trial courts 
to explain the risks of self-representation to the accused, no explanation is required), and 
United States v. Tompkins, 623 F.2d 824. 828-29 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that no special 
hearing is required for a valid waiver of an accused‟s right to counsel); cf. McDowell v. 
United States, 484 U.S. 980, 981 (1987) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(“Because a conflict among the lower courts has emerged concerning the proper application 
and interpretation of our decision in Faretta, I would grant certiorari and address the ques-
tion presented by this petition.”). 
92 John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assess-
ment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL 
CONST. L.J. 483, 516-17 (1996).  The Supreme Court, in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 
(1988), was presented with an opportunity to answer the question of whether a hearing or 
inquiry should be required whenever a defendant requests to proceed pro se; however, it 
failed to resolve the issue.  Id. at 298-300.  While the Court stated that the waiver of counsel 
standard articulated in Faretta should be applied, it failed to address the proper application 
of that standard.  Id. 
93 See Parton v. Wyrick, 704 F.2d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming the trial court‟s re-
fusal to allow defendant to proceed pro se when the request for self-representation was made 
on the morning of the trial). 
94 577 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1978). 
95 Id. at 868 (stating that the timeliness requirement is justified by “the need to minimize 
disruptions, to avoid inconvenience and delay, to maintain continuity, and to avoid confusing 
the jury”). 
14
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begun or before the jury has been impaneled, unless the request is a 
delay tactic.96  Thus, in order for defendant to validly waive his right 
to counsel he must make a clear, voluntarily, and intelligent waiver of 
the right to counsel in a timely manner, after being informed of the 
dangers inherent in his decision.97 
Additionally, to effectually waive his right to counsel, the de-
fendant must communicate his desire to proceed pro se to the court.98  
To effectively communicate a valid waiver of the right to counsel, the 
defendant must make a statement from which the trial judge can rea-
sonably conclude that defendant desires to proceed pro se.99  The de-
fendant should express this statement in unequivocal terms.100  How-
ever, when a defendant‟s desire to waive his right to counsel is less 
than clear, the validity of the waiver is left to the discretion of the 
court.101  In fact, some courts have allowed defendants to implicitly 
waive their right to counsel through conduct.102  For example, in 
United States v. Auen,103 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
held that defendant implicitly waived the right to counsel at trial by 
continually refusing legal representation after repeated offers.104  
 
96 Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1985). 
97 Id. 
98 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. 
99 Leonard v. State, 486 A.2d 163, 169 (Md. 1985). 
100 See People v. Gillian, 861 N.E.2d 92, 94 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that a defendant‟s re-
quest to represent himself was not clear and unequivocal where “defendant raised the argu-
ment for self-representation as a way of obtaining the dismissal of his first assigned coun-
sel”).  Compare Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1033 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
defendant did not “invoke his right to self-representation clearly and unequivocally”), with 
Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057, 1064 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that defendant un-
equivocally invoked his right to self-representation). 
101 See United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 670-71 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The question of 
waiver is one of inference from the facts.  As a matter both of logic and of common        
sense, . . . if a person is offered a [clear] choice between three things and says „no‟ to the first 
and the second, he‟s chosen the third even if he stands mute when asked whether the third is 
indeed his choice.”). 
102 See United States v. Irorere, 228 F.3d 816, 826 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that a defen-
dant can “waive the right to counsel through his own contumacious conduct”). 
103 864 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1988). 
104 Id. at 5; see also United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 1989) (conclud-
ing that defendant implicitly refused appointed counsel by dismissing four consecutive court 
appointed attorneys); United States v. Arlen, 252 F.2d 491, 494-95 (2d Cir. 1958) (explain-
ing that “where a defendant able to retain counsel has been advised by the court that he must 
retain counsel by a certain reasonable time, and where there is no showing why he has not 
retained counsel within that time, the court may treat his failure to provide for his own de-
fense as a waiver of his right to counsel and require such defendant to proceed to trial with-
15
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Moreover, other courts have treated defendant‟s failure to retain 
counsel, after being advised by the court to do so within a reasonable 
amount of time, as a failure to provide for his own defense, and the-
reby, a waiver of the right to counsel.105 
Similarly, New York courts require that a defendant‟s request 
to waive his right to counsel be made unequivocally and timely.106  A 
defendant‟s request to represent himself “ „must be clearly and un-
conditionally presented to the trial court‟ ” in order “to ensure con-
victed defendants [do] not „pervert the system by subsequently claim-
ing a denial of their pro se right.‟ ”107  An application to defend pro se 
is timely when it is asserted before the trial commences because “the 
potential for obstruction and diversion is minimal.”108  At that junc-
ture, the court can conduct a thorough inquiry without causing delay 
and confusion; however, once the trial begins the right is only granted 
under compelling circumstances.
 109 
Further, New York courts require that a defendant make a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel be-
 
out an attorney.  Such a waiver is similar in its consequences to an election made by an indi-
gent defendant.”). 
105 Spevak v. United States, 158 F.2d 594, 596 (4th Cir. 1946); United States v. Harten-
feld, 113 F.2d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 1940).  However, other circuits require misconduct on be-
half of defendant to establish a waiver of counsel through conduct.  United States v. Gold-
berg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir. 1995).  The court in Goldberg drew a distinction between 
the concept of forfeiture and the concept of waiver, indicating that “forfeiture results in the 
loss of a right regardless of the defendant‟s knowledge thereof and irrespective of whether 
the defendant intended to relinquish the right.”  Id. at 1100.  Only the Eleventh Circuit has 
acknowledged this distinction, as indicated by its decision in United States v. McLeod, 53 
F.3d 322 (11th Cir. 1995), in which it concluded that abuse by a defendant toward his attor-
ney might result in forfeiture of defendant‟s right to counsel.  Id. at 325.  But see United 
States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 258 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that a defendant who knowing-
ly retains an attorney with a scheduling conflict and fails to retain other counsel within a rea-
sonable time waives his right to counsel); United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (concluding that “persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and 
appointment of new counsel . . . is the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of counsel”).  Other courts insist that a waiver by conduct may result only after a de-
fendant has been warned that he will lose his attorney “if he engages in dilatory tactics,” and 
continues to engage in misconduct.  Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100; see, e.g., United States v. 
Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that defendant‟s failure to hire counsel 
constituted a waiver by conduct); United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1578 (10th Cir. 
1990) (concluding that defendant‟s dilatory conduct resulted in a waiver by conduct). 
106 McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327. 
107 People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 349 (N.Y. 2004) (quoting McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 
327). 
108 McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327. 
109 Id. 
16
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fore proceeding pro se.110  Determining whether a waiver is knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent requires courts to undertake a “searching 
inquiry” to ensure defendant is fully informed of the dangers and dis-
advantages of defending pro se.111  Thus, it is well established that a 
defendant can only waive his constitutional right to counsel if he is 
informed of the risks associated with doing so.112 
In People v. Ward,113 defendant appealed his conviction for 
robbery and assault on the ground that the court failed to ensure he 
fully understood the inherent dangers of defending pro se.114  The 
Appellate Division reiterated the importance of conducting an ex-
haustive inquiry into defendant‟s decision to waive his right to coun-
sel, which ensures that the choice is made willingly, with full know-
ledge of the dangers involved.115  This inquiry requires appropriate 
record evidence demonstrating that the trial court has delved into de-
fendant‟s age, education, occupation, previous exposure to legal pro-
cedures, and other relevant factors bearing on a competent, intelli-
gent, and voluntary waiver.116  However, the court need not evaluate 
all of these factors to find a valid waiver of counsel.  In evaluating 
the validity of a waiver, New York courts have “eschewed applica-
tion of any rigid formula and endorsed the use of a nonformalistic, 
flexible inquiry.”117 
In People v. Smith,118 the New York Court of Appeals indi-
cated that the trial court‟s record exploration of the issue “must ac-
complish the goals of adequately warning a defendant of the risks in-
herent in proceeding pro se, and apprising a defendant of the singular 
importance of the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudica-
tion.”119  Based on these flexible criteria, courts have noted that a 
waiver of the right to counsel will not be deemed ineffective simply 
because the trial judge does not ask questions designed to elicit each 
 
110 Id. 
111 People v. Slaughter, 583 N.E.2d 919, 923 (N.Y. 1991). 
112 Id. 
113 613 N.Y.S.2d 490 (App. Div. 1994). 
114 Id. at 491. 
115 Id. 
116 McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327. 
117 People v. Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (N.Y. 2002) (endorsing a non-formalistic 
flexible inquiry). 
118 705 N.E.2d 1205 (N.Y. 1998). 
119 Id. at 1208. 
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of the specific items of information.120  Still, there is no existing stan-
dardized procedure for admonishing defendants of the dangers of 
self-representation, leaving lower courts with “broad discretion in 
how they warn defendants.”121  Thus, the degree of protection af-
forded to defendants “largely depends upon the courtroom in which 
they are prosecuted.”122 
B.  Defining the Role of Standby Counsel 
In Faretta, the Court asserted that a trial court may—even 
over the objection of defendant—appoint standby counsel in self-
representation cases to assist defendant if and when he seeks help, 
and to take over if self-representation must be terminated during tri-
al.123  In McKaskle v. Wiggins,124 the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the role of standby counsel and upheld defendant‟s convic-
tion, despite standby counsel providing unsolicited and undesirable 
assistance.125  In Wiggins, the court appointed two attorneys to serve 
as standby counsel to pro se defendant.126  Throughout the trial, de-
fendant altered his desire for assistance of standby counsel, fluctuat-
ing from requesting support to resisting assistance.127  After defen-
dant was convicted and sentenced to life in prison, he appealed his 
conviction on the ground that standby counsel had improperly inter-
fered with his right to conduct his own defense, thereby depriving 
him of his right to self-representation.128 
Establishing a two-part test for determining when standby 
counsel violates a criminal defendant‟s right to self-representation, 
 
120 People v. Providence, 813 N.E.2d 632, 635 (2004); see also Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d at 
1156 (stating that when determining if a defendant effectively waived the right to counsel, 
all that is required is a reliable basis for appellate review). 
121 Decker, supra note 92, at 516-17. 
122 Id. 
123 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. 
124 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
125 Id. at 173. 
126 Id. at 170-71. 
127 Id. at 171-73. 
128 Id. at 170.  The Fifth Circuit held that Wiggins‟ Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation was violated by the unwanted involvement of standby counsel.  Wiggins v. 
Estelle, 681 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 
168 (1984).  In doing so, it sought to establish a clear rule that “court-appointed standby 
counsel is „to be seen, but not heard.‟ ”  Id. at 273. 
18
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the Court held that standby counsel did not infringe upon defendant‟s 
right to self-representation.129  According to the Court, the pro se de-
fendant must first establish that he retained “actual control over the 
case.”130  A defendant does not maintain actual control if standby 
counsel substantially interferes with significant tactical decisions of 
defendant, assumes control of the questioning of witnesses, or speaks 
on matters of importance in defendant‟s place against his objection.131  
Next, participation by standby counsel without the consent of defen-
dant should not be allowed to destroy the jury‟s perception that de-
fendant is representing himself.132  Ultimately, the Court found that 
defendant maintained actual control over the case and that participa-
tion of standby counsel did not destroy the jury‟s perception that de-
fendant was representing himself.133  Thus, despite the fact that 
standby counsel intervened without defendant‟s permission over fifty 
times during the three-day trial,134 the Court found that defendant was 
afforded his right to self-representation.135  Although the Court in 
Wiggins attempted to provide guidelines, the question of what consti-
tutes acceptable participation of standby counsel without obstructing 
the right to self-representation remains unresolved. 
Likewise, New York courts allow for the appointment of 
standby counsel for pro se defendants, even over objections.136  How-
ever, the appointment of standby counsel is not a constitutional right, 
but a matter of trial judge management, which is left to the discretion 
of the judge.137  In People v. Mirenda,138 the New York Court of Ap-
peals found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by deny-
 
129 McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177-79, 188. 
130 Id. at 178. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 178-79. 
133 Id. at 185. 
134 See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 191 (White, J., dissenting). 
135 Id. at 185 (majority opinion).  But see id. at 195 (White, J., dissenting) (expressing 
concerns about allowing standby counsel to impede on the rights of pro se defendants). 
136 People v. Sawyer, 438 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (N.Y. 1982); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE 6-3.7 (American Bar Associa-
tion, 3d ed. 2000), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications 
/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_trialjudge.html#6-3.7 (stating that it is 
advisable to appoint standby counsel to protect defendants and to facilitate the trial, not only 
in serious cases, but in cases expected to be long or complicated or where there are multiple 
defendants). 
137 People v. Mirenda, 442 N.E.2d 49, 51 (N.Y. 1982). 
138 Id. 
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ing defendant‟s request for standby counsel, because defendant was 
fully aware of the potential pitfalls of self-representation.139  Moreo-
ver, because there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of 
standby counsel, defendants are not entitled to relief for the ineffec-
tiveness of standby counsel, unless standby counsel “held that title in 
name only . . . [but in reality,] acted as the defendant‟s lawyer 
throughout the proceedings.”140 
Moreover, New York courts have set parameters for the 
amount of intervention standby counsel may have without violating 
defendant‟s right to present his own case.  In People v. Hilts,141 the 
Appellate Division instructed standby counsel only to assist defen-
dant upon his request, forewarning counsel not to provide unsolicited 
advice during trial.142  Relatedly, in People v. Nevitt,143 the Appellate 
Division concluded that standby counsel did not unduly interfere with 
defendant‟s right to try his case because counsel conferred with de-
fendant, obtained consent before challenging any of the jurors, and 
defendant failed to object to any of counsel‟s representation during 
the trial.144 
One thing that is clear: standby counsel can serve as a worthy 
tool for pro se defendants, who lack access to many legal materials 
available to lawyers.145  Also, standby counsel can assist by stepping 
in if defendant chooses to be absent from the trial.  Thus, judges may 
appoint standby counsel at their discretion in an effort to promote jus-
tice and grant impartial trials.146 
 
139 Id. 
140 United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1997). 
141 846 N.Y.S.2d 750 (App. Div. 2007). 
142 Id. at 752 (finding that while a defendant has a right to proceed pro se, he has no right 
to hybrid representation, and thus the county court was well within its authority to impose 
restrictions on assigned counsel‟s continued assistance). 
143 619 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div. 1994). 
144 Id. at 7. 
145 See United States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226, 227 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding 
“that when a defendant (pretrial detainee) is offered the assistance of appointed counsel and 
refuses the same, no constitutional right exists mandating that the prisoner in the alternative 
be provided access to a law library should he choose to refuse the services of court-
appointed counsel”).  
146 Decker, supra note 92, at 537. 
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C.  Hybrid Representation 
Courts uniformly hold that defendant is not entitled to hybrid 
representation, wherein defendant serves as co-counsel at his own tri-
al.147  Faretta does not guarantee a constitutional right to hybrid re-
presentation, as a defendant has the right to either conduct his own 
defense or have an attorney conduct his defense—but not both.148  
However, while the right to “hybrid representation is not constitu-
tionally guaranteed, it is constitutionally permissible,” as demonstrat-
ed by some courts allowing the accused to assume various lawyering 
functions,149 but only as a “matter of grace.”150 
Despite lack of agreement among jurisdictions as to whether 
hybrid representation is permissible, there are several “well-adhered-
to rules” regarding the complex issue:151  First, by retaining counsel, 
a criminal defendant relinquishes “the right to conduct part of his 
own defense.”152  Second, where hybrid representation is permitted, 
the court is still required to “obtain a valid waiver of counsel from the 
defendant.”153  Third, once a defendant elects “to proceed pro se, the 
defendant cannot conduct part of the trial and then ask counsel to 
conduct other portions.”154  Finally, after a pro se defendant wel-
comes “participation by counsel, any subsequent participation by 
counsel is presumed to occur with the defendant‟s approval, unless 
the defendant expressly and unambiguously renews the request to 
proceed without counsel.”155 
In People v. Rodriguez,156 the New York Court of Appeals 
stated, “While the Sixth Amendment and the State Constitution af-
 
147 See Wilson v. Hurt, 39 Fed. App‟x 324, 327 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding no constitutional 
right to hybrid representation). 
148 McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183. 
149 Decker, supra note 92, at 537-39. 
150 State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 359 (Tenn. 1982). 
151 Decker, supra note 92, at 539-40. 
152 Id. (citing United States v. Treff, 924 F.2d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that any 
decision to allow or disallow hybrid representation rests in the discretion of the trial court)). 
153 Id. (citing United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720, 721 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
“[t]he district court has the authority to allow, if the accused desires, a hybrid form of repre-
sentation in which the accused assumes some of the lawyer‟s functions”)). 
154 Id. (citing People v. Partee, 511 N.E.2d 1165, 1177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)). 
155 Id. (citing McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183). 
156 741 N.E.2d 882, 884 (N.Y. 2000) (indicating that a criminal defendant has no constitu-
tional right to hybrid representation). 
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ford a defendant the right to counsel or to self-representation, they do 
not guarantee a right to both.  These are „separate rights depicted on 
the opposite sides of the same [constitutional] coin.  To choose one 
obviously means to forego the other.‟ ”157  Based on this assertion, 
the court emphasized that the decision to allow hybrid representation 
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and acknowledged 
that many courts have refused to recognize a right of defendants 
represented by counsel to simultaneously act in their own defense.158  
In fact, some courts prohibit hybrid representation altogether.159  
 
D.  Forfeiting the Right to Self-representation 
A defendant‟s right to self-representation may be terminated 
when defendant engages in seriously obstructive behavior, based on 
the court‟s responsibility to maintain order, safety, and prevent dis-
ruption and delay in the courtroom.  In Faretta, the Court stated, 
“The right to self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity 
of the courtroom” nor the right to engage in “serious and obstruction-
ist misconduct.”160  In other words, the right to self-representation is 
not “to be used as a tactic for delay, for disruption, for distortion of 
the system, or for manipulation of the trial process.”161 
Although courts have attempted to provide guidelines in de-
termining when disruptive conduct should result in forfeiture of the 
right to self-representation, drawing the line “between a manipulative 
effort to present arguments and a sincere desire to dispense with the 
benefits of counsel” has presented challenges.
 162  In United States v. 
Vernier,163 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that defen-
dant was not unconstitutionally denied his right to self-representation 
 
157 Id. at 884 (quoting United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir 1990)) (alteration 
in original). 
158 Id. at 885. 
159 See Parren v. State, 523 A.2d 597, 599 (Md. 1987) (“[T]here are only two types of re-
presentation constitutionally guaranteed—representation by counsel and representation pro 
se—and they are mutually exclusive.”).  The Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to allow 
hybrid representation, mandating that Maryland courts strictly ensure that defendants pro-
ceed with or without effective assistance of counsel.  Id. 
160 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. 
161 United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2000). 
162 Id. 
163 381 Fed. App‟x 325, 325 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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in his prosecution for carjacking when he “posed a risk of violence 
and escape, . . . was defiant and troublesome, . . . boasted that he 
wanted to go out in a bloody confrontation, to disrupt his trial, and to 
make news,” and attempted a violent escape from jail in the forty-
eight hours preceding trial.164  The court reasoned that the limitation 
of defendant‟s right to defend pro se was warranted because his be-
havior was intended to cause delay or some tactical advantage.165  
Additionally, Faretta suggested that if a pro se defendant is removed 
from the court proceedings due to disruptive behavior, standby coun-
sel is permitted to step in to conduct his defense.166 
The New York Court of Appeals also limited the right to self-
representation by mandating that a defendant may not engage in con-
duct which would prevent the “fair and orderly exposition of the is-
sues.”167  The court in McIntyre declared, “When a defendant‟s con-
duct is calculated to undermine, upset or unreasonably delay the 
progress of the trial he forfeits his right to self-representation.”168  
However, despite articulating this principle, the court concluded that 
defendant‟s misconduct was a provoked outburst that did not justify 
the forfeiture of defendant‟s right to self-representation.169  In People 
v. Cooks,170 the Appellate Division authorized limiting self-
representation based on misconduct when it upheld the trial court‟s 
revocation of the right to self-representation, when “[d]efendant was 
disruptive, feigned mental illness, feigned physical ailments and re-
 
164 Id. at 329. 
165 Id. at 328; see also United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that defendant‟s behavior demonstrated that he was playing “cat and mouse” with 
the court by requesting to represent himself); Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 797 (3d Cir. 
2000) (stating that determining whether a pro se defendant intends only disruption and delay 
is the kind of determination district courts must make routinely, but holding that the court 
did not make a sufficient inquiry). 
166 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46; see also United States v. Trapnell, 638 F.2d 1016, 1027 
(7th Cir. 1980) (permitting standby counsel to take over for an absent pro se defendant to 
prevent undue delay or mistrial). 
167 McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327. 
168 Id. at 328. 
169 Id. (“Just as the court may not rely on a postruling outburst to validate an erroneous 
denial, the court may not goad the defendant to disruptive behavior by conducting its inquiry 
in an abusive manner calculated to belittle a legitimate application.”).  But see id. at 329 
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that defendant‟s behavior resulted from the trial 
judge‟s provocation and concluding that defendant waived his right to defend pro se by his 
disruptive conduct). 
170 812 N.Y.S.2d 529 (App. Div. 2006). 
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peatedly asked to leave the courtroom and claimed illness when 
summoned back.”171  In sum, the governmental interest in ensuring 
the integrity and efficiency of the judicial process will at times out-
weigh a defendant‟s interest in acting as his own lawyer. 
E.  Mental Competency 
The United States Supreme Court, by delineating the requisite 
degree of mental competency for defendants, has further limited the 
right to self-representation.  In Godinez v. Moran,172 the Supreme 
Court ruled that the competency standard used to determine a defen-
dant‟s ability to waive the right to counsel is no higher than that used 
to determine a defendant‟s ability to stand trial.173  Hence, if a defen-
dant is competent to stand trial, no further examination by the court is 
necessary.  The Court reasoned that “the competence that is required 
of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence 
to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself.”174  Es-
sentially, the Court insisted that the decision to waive counsel should 
not require any higher level of mental capacity than what is required 
to waive other constitutional rights.175  Thus, while waiving the right 
to counsel requires that courts conduct an extensive inquiry into de-
fendant‟s decision, defendant need not maintain any heightened level 
of competence to enter into such a decision in the first place—all that 
is required is a knowing and voluntary waiver.176 
The Supreme Court first articulated a standard of mental 
competence for criminal defendants on trial in Dusky v. United 
States.177  The Court held that in order for a defendant to be consi-
dered competent for a criminal proceeding he must have “sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding—and . . . [must have] a rational as well as fac-
 
171 Id. at 530; see also People v. Thomas, 900 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775-76 (App. Div. 2010) 
(holding that the trial court properly denied defendant his right to self-representation because 
a fair and orderly trial “would not have been feasible” in light of defendant‟s position that, 
among other things, he was entitled to absolute immunity because he was “Almighty God” 
and “King of the United States,” and that he was born on a day the earth spun backwards). 
172 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
173 Id. at 399. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 400. 
177 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
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tual understanding of the proceedings against him.”178  Thus, all that 
is required is that “the accused must be sufficiently competent to fol-
low the proceedings, evaluate the evidence, and understand the signi-
ficance of what is transpiring in the courtroom.”179  This standard has 
been widely criticized by those who cannot see why “[a]n infinitely 
more comprehensive and intricate command of the law is required of 
a competent attorney, yet the application of the Dusky test allows the 
layperson who wishes to proceed pro se to do so despite a lack of 
technical legal knowledge, at best, and regardless of mental illness, at 
worst.”180  Although the right to competent counsel is undoubtedly an 
essential right of any defendant, a defendant forfeits this right in 
choosing to proceed pro se.  Hence, the guidelines articulated in Go-
dinez and Dusky raise countervailing concerns.  On the one hand, 
there are those who wish to firmly uphold the autonomy of self-
representation without heightening any requirement of competence.  
However, others fear lower standards of competency fail to appro-
priately assess a defendant‟s ability to conduct his own defense.181 
In Indiana v. Edwards,182 the Supreme Court addressed the 
concerns of Dusky critics by considering whether a state may bar the 
accused from defending himself when defendant is “a criminal de-
fendant whom a state court found mentally competent to stand trial if 
represented by counsel but not mentally competent to conduct the tri-
al himself.”183  The Court stated: 
 
[T]he Constitution permits judges to take realistic ac-
count of the particular defendant‟s mental               
capacities . . .  [and] permits States to insist upon re-
presentation by counsel for those competent enough 
to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from 
 
178 Id. 
179 Decker, supra note 92, at 519. 
180 Id.; see also Godinez, 509 U.S. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“A person who is 
„competent‟ to play basketball is not thereby „competent‟ to play the violin.”). 
181 See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 417 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“To try, convict, and punish 
one so helpless to defend himself contravenes fundamental principles of fairness and im-
pugns the integrity of our criminal justice system.”). 
182 554 U.S.164 (2008). 
183 Id. at 167.  In its analysis, the Court revisited the Faretta holding, and made clear that 
Faretta did not answer the issue regarding mental competency, noting that both the decision 
itself and later cases have affirmed that the right to self-representation is not absolute.  Id. at 
171. 
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severe mental illness to the point where they are not 
competent to conduct trial proceedings by them-
selves.184   
 
The decision in Edwards demonstrates an effort on behalf of the 
Court to protect societal interests and to maintain judicial efficiency 
by permitting courts to inquire “whether a defendant who seeks to 
conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.”185 
However, despite Edwards’ allowance for states to differentiate be-
tween a defendant‟s competency to stand trial and a defendant‟s 
competency to defend pro se, courts continue to adhere to low stan-
dards in making this determination.186  In fact, some courts have bla-
tantly rejected any suggestion of a higher standard of competence for 
waiver of counsel.187 
In People v. Reason,188 the New York Court of Appeals re-
jected the contention that there are two separate and distinct levels of 
mental capacity—one standard to stand trial, and another standard to 
waive the right to counsel.189  The court noted that the requirement of 
mental competency to stand trial arose at a time before defendant was 
entitled to have counsel assigned, and therefore was intended to en-
sure he had sufficient mental capacity to understand the proceedings 
and make his own defense.190  Based on this history, the court main-
tained that it would be nonsensical to conclude that a standard de-
signed to determine whether a defendant was capable of defending 
himself is inadequate when he chooses to conduct his own defense.191  
Moreover, the court observed the pragmatic difficulties involved in 
formulating a workable, heightened standard to assess competency 
 
184 Id. at 177-78. 
185 Id. 
186 Decker, supra note 92, at 522-23 (noting the case of Colin Ferguson, who was con-
victed of six counts of murder for his “shooting rampage on a commuter train in Long Isl-
and, New York, [which] illustrates the potentially devastating injustice caused by allowing 
an incompetent defendant to proceed pro se”). 
187 See People v. Anderson, No. C058629, 2009 WL 3809633, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 
16, 2009) (stating that under California law, “a defendant competent to stand trial is also 
competent to waive his right to counsel, and therefore a court cannot require a higher stan-
dard of competence to accept the waiver.”). 
188 334 N.E.2d 572 (N.Y. 1975). 
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without infringing on a defendant‟s constitutional right to self-
representation.192  According to the court, however, mental capacity 
remains relevant in the waiver of counsel because the determination 
that it is intelligent and voluntary “may well turn, even in major part, 
on the mental capability of the defendant at the time in the circums-
tances.”193 
In People v. Tafari,194 the Appellate Division held that defen-
dant was improperly denied his constitutional right to self-
representation when his request to represent himself at trial was de-
nied due to mental illness and concerns that his medication would af-
fect his ability to understand the proceedings.195  The court reasoned 
that because defendant was examined and found competent after res-
ponding to the court‟s apprehensions about the risks of proceeding 
pro se, he should have been afforded his right to self-
representation.196  Moreover, in People v. Reilly,197 the Appellate Di-
vision held that the trial court was not required to order a competency 
examination of defendant before it granted defendant‟s application to 
defend pro se.198  In that case, defendant, who was arrested and 
charged with burglary and larceny, was hospitalized for approximate-
ly three weeks and diagnosed as suffering from manic-depressive 
disorder.199  Defendant elected to proceed pro se at trial and his re-
quest was granted.200  Defendant‟s right to proceed pro se was later 
revoked when he attempted to have a witness identify him as Jesus 
Christ; however, he was ultimately found competent to stand trial and 
convicted on all counts.201  On appeal, observing that appropriate 
warnings and careful consideration were provided, the court found 




193 Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574. 
194 891 N.Y.S.2d 711 (App. Div. 2009). 
195 Id. at 713. 
196 Id. 
197 631 N.Y.S.2d 203 (App. Div. 1995). 
198 Id. at 203-04. 
199 Id. at 203. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Reilly, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 203-04. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
While the Sixth Amendment is intended to provide protection 
to defendants in the criminal trial process, the Supreme Court‟s deci-
sion in Faretta has largely undermined this purpose.  Moreover, the 
explicit grant of the right to self-representation provided in the New 
York State Constitution has only further eroded “jurisprudential inte-
grity.”203  In constitutionalizing the right to self-representation, courts 
were left to cope with the onerous task of defining the extent of this 
right, which has resulted in a plethora of inconsistent decisions 
among jurisdictions.204  While the Court‟s decision in Faretta was 
justifiably intended to promote the autonomy and uphold the rights of 
criminal defendants, it has resulted in injurious implications for those 
accused, who ignorantly forfeit competent legal representation to 
their own detriment. 
Not only does the decision continue to present harmful conse-
quences for defendants who choose to exercise this right, but it has 
also damaged the integrity and efficiency of the courts by wasting 
judicial resources.  Regardless of whether a judge grants a defen-
dant‟s request to proceed pro se, the decision will likely be ap-
pealed.205  If the judge allows defendant to represent himself at trial, 
which likely will result in a conviction, defendant will argue on ap-
peal that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent.206  Conversely, 
if the judge refuses to allow defendant to proceed pro se, defendant 
will likely appeal on the ground that his constitutional right to self-
representation was violated.207 
Requirements imposed on trial courts seek to limit the harm-
ful effects of the decision, such as providing warnings to defendants 
of the harmful repercussions of defending pro se, mandating that all 
waivers be knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and appointing stand-
by counsel.  Further limiting the right to self-representation, courts 
recognize forfeiture in the event of obstreperous behavior and require 
that the exercise of all requests in a timely manner.  However, while 
 
203 Decker, supra note 92, at 598. 
204 Id. at 488-89. 
205 Brian H. Wright, The Formal Inquiry Approach: Balancing a Defendant’s Right to 
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attempting to limit the burden which pro se representation places on 
ensuring the fair and orderly administration of justice, these limita-
tions have in effect caused further inconsistencies among the courts. 
Since Faretta’s recognition of the right of self-representation, 
courts have struggled to grapple with the multiplicity of difficult legal 
issues that have arisen.  First, courts remain burdened by the task of 
deciphering exactly what constitutes a waiver of the right to counsel.  
While some courts have demanded relinquishment of the right to 
counsel be unambiguous and unequivocal, others have interpreted re-
peated refusals to cooperate with counsel as an implicit election to 
defend pro se.  Second, while courts conclusively agree that defen-
dants should be admonished of the dangers of self-representation, 
there is no clear standard governing the communications a trial judge 
may impart without infringing on the right to self-representation.  
Moreover, while agreeing that requests to defend pro se must be 
timely, no definite standard for what constitutes a timely waiver of 
the right to counsel exists. 
Third, courts remain constrained in their power to judge a de-
fendant‟s incompetency by the assertion that pro se defendants are 
not required to possess any legal abilities whatsoever.  Although the 
Supreme Court attempted to distinguish mental capacity to stand trial 
from mental capacity to represent oneself, courts continue to rely on 
the same standard, thereby endorsing ill-fated inept defendants to 
embark on a path of self-destruction.  Fourth, courts struggle to de-
fine a fitting role for standby counsel, who may be imposed upon a 
pro se defendant against his wishes, but who avoids Faretta’s charac-
terization of becoming a “master.”  It is difficult to reconcile a right 
derived from the Sixth Amendment, which recognizes that competent 
counsel may impair a defendant‟s right to self-representation, with 
the subsequent imposition of standby counsel on a defendant who be-
lieves he has the boundless authority to represent himself.  Neverthe-
less, courts are still faced with the challenge of defining the scope of 
authority maintained by standby counsel, making it difficult to de-
termine when involvement crosses the line. 
If these procedural questions were the only issues left to re-
solve, there might be hope for one day establishing uniformity of 
procedure for pro se defendants.  However, any optimism is shattered 
when one evaluates the additional difficulties posed by pro se defen-
dants, who tend to be a thorn in the side of any trial court that en-
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counters them.  Defendants wish to proceed pro se for a variety of 
reasons.  Most of the time defendants want to demonstrate their dis-
respect for authority, exhibit their rebelliousness and hostility, mani-
pulate the justice system, or promote a radical political scheme.208  
Even if these defendants have no hidden agenda, they are often so 
outlandish and irrational that they believe they can succeed.209  How-
ever, regardless of whether pro se defendants are “political extrem-
ist[s], . . . misfit[s], or . . . incorrigible career criminal[s] with nothing 
to lose,” they all have one undeniable thing in common—they are 
rarely acting in their best interest.210  It is illogical to believe that a 
defendant facing criminal charges with no legal background what-
soever can effectively construct and articulate a defense, a skill that 
takes any competent attorney years of schooling and experience to 
master.  Thus, to afford defendants the detrimental right to defend pro 
se in no way promotes the Sixth Amendment‟s policy of safeguarding 
the interests of a criminal defendant.  Furthermore, pro se defendants 
have fittingly earned a reputation of being disruptive and troublesome 
to the judicial process.  Therefore, while defendants should never be 
afforded the right to self-annihilation, it certainly should not come at 
the expense of safely administering justice in the courtroom. 
In People v. Smith, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Term, upheld the right of a criminal defendant to proceed pro se.211  
This decision signifies an effort to preserve the right to self-
representation by ensuring pro se defendants an opportunity to partic-
ipate in sidebar conferences.  The decision demonstrates an additional 
attempt by the court to define the scope of self-representation, an area 
that was left largely undefined by the Faretta decision and remains 
unresolved.  Setting these boundaries poses an infinite task that has 
only resulted in limitations of the right followed by subsequent ex-
pansions with little standardization among jurisdictions.  Thus, the 
pro se defendant‟s scanty chance of success also largely depends on 
the courtroom in which he sits.  Courts will continue to struggle to 
uphold the right of self-representation while simultaneously battling 
the stark implications that accompany this right.  Despite the interest 
of autonomy that underlies its conception, the right to self-
 
208 Decker, supra note 92, at 485-87. 
209 Id. at 487. 
210 Id. at 597-98. 
211 Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 539. 
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representation continues to engulf the very purpose for which it was 
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